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In this paper, I aim to explain the nature of time and of the now in 
Aristotle as much as possible so that I can set forth the problem of what the 
relation between time and the now is. In his Physics in book IV, Chapter 10, 
Aristotle illustrates his version of time.1 At first sight, Aristotle examines that 
time exists and what it is and in how many senses we speak of the now and 
what sometime, lately, presently or just, long ago, suddenly and so on mean. 
In order to disclose the nature of time and the importance of the now in 
terms of Aristotle, first I am going to try to summarize what Aristotle says 
about time, and then I will look into the concept of the now since it strikes 
me that time is centered on it in Aristotle’s version of time.  
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ÖZET 
Aristoteles ve Zaman Problemi 
 
Bu çalışmada amacım zaman ve şimdi (an) arasındaki ilişki soru-
nunu gözler önüne serebilmek için, elden geldiğince zamanın ve şimdinin 
(anın) yapısını açığa kavuşturmaktır. Aristoteles zamana ilişkin görüşlerini 
Fizik adlı yapıtının IV. Kitabının 10. Bölümü’nde sunar. Aristoteles ilk 
                                                   
* Yard. Doç. Dr.; Adnan Menderes University, Department of Philosophy. 
1 Aristotle also speaks of time as one of the ten categories in his work Logic. For 
more information see A new Aristotle Reader edit by J.L. Ackrill. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 5-12. 
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bakışta zamanın varlığını , onun ne olduğunu, kaç anlamda şimdi (an) den 
söz ettiğimizi, bazen, son zamanlarda, demin ya da henüz, çok önce, ansızın 
ve benzeri şeylerin ne anlama geldiğini ele alır. Aristoteles açısından zama-
nın doğasını ve şimdinin (anın) önemini kavramak için, ilkin Aristoteles’in 
zamana ilişkin söylediklerini özetlemeye çalışacağım; sonra da şimdi (an) 
kavramını soruşturacağım, çünkü öyle sanıyorum ki, Aristoteles’in zaman 
görüşü şimdi (an) üstüne kuruludur.  
Anahtar Kelimler: Zaman, şimdi (an), zamanın doğası. 
 
Introduction 
Aristotle is one of the most influential philosophers of the history of 
philosophy. His areas of interest are varies from logic to metaphysics, 
natural science, psychology, biology, ethics, politics, art and so on. Like his 
predecessors, he wanted to figure out what is real. For him, a view of reality 
should allow not only sense objects but also values to be real. Besides, 
Aristotle held that a good enough account of reality must resolve the 
problem of change, which has been with us from the beginning. Despite the 
fact that change is one of the most clear facts of experience, it seems not to 
be rational, because if we say that X changes to Y, we appear to be claiming 
that X is both itself and not itself. From Thales onwards each thinker and 
philosopher, including Plato who asserted that the real and the knowable can 
not be changeable, had struggled with this problem. Aristotle’s analysis of 
reality in terms of form and matter made it possible for the first time to come 
to grip with change. The individual X turns out on analysis to be a complex; 
it is a substance, a formed matter. During its change into Y some part of X 
endures unchanged and some part of X alters. What endures is X’s matter; 
what changes is its form. According to Aristotle, natural science is 
concerned with the changes of natural objects and every change is the 
fulfillment or the coming to actuality of some potentiality. Whenever an 
object X that is potentially Y becomes Y, there is change that is the process 
by which X’s potantiality to be B is realized. The types of changes are 
qualitative, quantitative, locomotive and substantival. Moreover, it seems to 
be out of the question for Aristotle to conceive a time at which there is no 
change.2 Hence the question pursued particularly from Aristotle down is 
what is time? According to Brennan3, the Greeks thought that time was 
essentially a measure of motion, which is a kind of change displayed by the 
                                                   
2 W.T. Jones. The Classical Mind. New York. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 
1969. pp.216-228. 
3 J.G. Brennan. The Meaning of Philosophy. New York. Harper & Row 
Publishers. New York. 1967. p.208. 
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movement of the sidereal universe. Thus time is a category subordinate to 
space. To Plato and Plotinus, time was semireal, something that came into 
being only with the creation of the world. In the realm of the true being, 
eternity, not time, prevails. Medieval thinkers too were apt to follow the 
ancients in distinquishing the world of time from God’s world in which there 
is no time but eternity. In contrast, twentieth-century metaphysicians like 
Bergson and Whitehead advanced the notion, handed on from the preceding 
century, that time is an inseparable dimension of the nature of things; that is 
to say, there is nothing outside time. They thought that reality is an on-going 
creativity, an endless advance into real novelty, as well as perpetual 
perishing. Earlier, Hegel’s historically oriented philosophy had nourished the 
belief among Continental philosophers that man is essentially a temporal 
being, that human nature cannot be understood outside of time. From this 
source ran a stream leading to the current of thought called Existentialism.4 
That’s why, in my opinion, in order to figure out the problem of what time is 
by taking advantage of examining Aristotles’ version of time and to shed 
light on the matter at hand now, it is essential to illustrate and analyze the 




Now it is time I analysed Aristotle’s own discussion of time in the 
Physics in detail. Aristotle starts by proposing an inquiry into the existence 
or non-existence of time. At the begining, he sets out three arguments for 
showing that time does not exist. First, he says that time consists of the past 
and the future, however the former no longer exists and the latter does not 
yet exist. That is to say, what is composed of nonentities is a nonentity, so 
time is a nonentity. To quote Aristotle: 
 
… first does it belong to the class of things that exist or to that of 
things that do not exist? Then secondly, what is its nature? To start, 
then: the following considerations would make one suspect that it 
either does not exist at al lor barely, and in an obscure way. One 
part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is 
not yet…5 
 
                                                   
4 J.G. Brennan. The Meaning of Philosophy. New York. Harper & Row 
Publishers. New York. 1967. p. 209. 
5 Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. (Translator: Richard Mckeon). New 
York. The Oxford University Press. 1941. p. 289. 
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Second, he asserts that if time itself exists, either all or some of its 
parts must exist; besides if time exists, it will be continuous and divisible 
(we can divide it as past and future), so all or some of its parts must 
necessarily exist. But no part of time does exist because its parts are the past 
and the future, and neither of these exists; therefore time also does not exist. 
This argument is different from the first one because this one proceeds 
hypothetically; furthermore, the first argument is based on the composition 
of parts while second one is based on their division. In a few words, the first 
one treats time as composite while the second as divisible. With the words of 
Aristotle: 
 
… if a divisible thing is to exist, it is necessary that, when it exists, 
all or some of its parts must exist. But of time some parts have 
been, while others have to be, and no part of it is, though it is 
divisible.6  
 
Third, he claims that the now seems to be a part of time; but it is not 
a part of time. It is because a part is a measure of the whole of time; 
therefore the now is not a part of time. It is a property of parts of a whole 
that the whole is measured by the part. Furthermore, the part is constitutive 
of the whole, but the now is not a constituent. For that reason, time does not 
consist of nows as the line is not composed of points.7  
As we have seen, Aristotle took the now to be an existent and 
showed that it is not a part of time. For the time being, by using this third 
argument, he tries to show that not even the now which seems to exist and to 
divide the past and the future is anything. For it is necessary, if the now 
exists for it to be the same or one after another which is equal to not being 
the same. If it is not the same nor one after another, it is clear that it does not 
exist. So he first proves that there is not one after another; if there is one now 
after another, the earlier must have ceased to be, but the now cannot have 
ceased to be; therefore nows are not one after another. He proves the 
conditional from a former now not being simultaneous with a later. For there 
cannot be two times at once unless one is longer, the other shorter and one 
contains the other, as the year is related to the month it contains and the 
month to the day it contains; for a certain day of the month is said to be 
present and the month also and so they seem to be simultaneous. But one 
now cannot be contained by another, nor can one be a part, the other the 
                                                   
6 Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. (Translator: Richard Mckeon). New 
York. The Oxford University Press. 1941. p.289. 
7 Aristotle, ibid. p. 289. 
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whole; for both are without parts and neither longer than the other. Nor are 
they quantities but starting points of quantities. 
But being greater occurs in quantities so that they cannot be 
simultaneous and it is necessary for the former to have ceased to be if they 
are one after another. Moreover it is impossible for the now to have ceased 
to be by means of a division. For, if it has ceased to be, then since what 
ceases to be does so in time, it must cease to be at itself or at another now. 
But it cannot cease to be at itself, for then it exists so, if at another, then, 
since nows are not adjacent to each other, but it has ceased to be in another 
now, it is clear that it existed in the interval between itself and that in which 
it ceased to be. But between nows, there is a time, as there is a line between 
points. So it existed in the time between; but there are infinitely many nows 
in the time between, given that all time is infinitely divisible and the division 
is at the nows. So there will be simultaneously the now itself and those in 
which it exists infinite in number, if it existed in the time between. But nor 
does the now cease to be in the whole of the time in between, for that to be 
so, a part of the now will have to cease to exist in each part of the time, but it 
has no parts. So a now does not cease to be neither at a now nor in the 
intervening time. 
After he showed that it is impossible for the now to be one after 
another, he next proves by two arguments that it also cannot remain always 
numerically identical. I am going to look at Urmson’s interpretation here so 
that we can figure it out clearly. According to Urmson, first, if there is no 
finite divisible thing that has a single limit whether it is undimensionally 
continuous like a line, or two dimensionally like a surface or three 
dimensionally like a body; it is clear that the nows which limit a finite time 
cannot be one and the same. Second, Aristotle shows that now cannot remain 
forever. For if there is the same now forever, everything will be at the same 
now, and neither earlier nor later. In this case, the long ago and the recent 
will be of the same date if things at the same now are at the same date. So if 
it is necessary for the now, if it exists either to be the same or one after 
another and if it is neither the same nor one after another, it is clear that the 
now is not among existents. While drawing this conclusion, Aristotle adds 
that the discussion of the attributes of time from which he clearly shows that 
it does not exist is at an end. As a rule, it is vital that time should be 
continuous if it exists; but the now does not join onto either past or future 
time, since neither of these is actually existing; it is clear that it could not be 
continuous.8  
                                                   
8 J.O. Urmson. On Aristotle’s Physics. New York. Cornell University Press. 1992. 
p.107. 
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As we have seen, Aristotle showed that the existence of time is 
unclear since the arguments for its non-existence are so persuasive. He next 
says that one will find both the definition of time and its nature equally 
unclear if one tries to examine them in the light of tradition as its existence 
seemed in the discussions which we previously went through. So its 
definition is unclear also, given that some say that time is the motion and 
revolution of the whole. Some say that it is the sphere of the heavens itself. 
Others say that it is change. For Aristotle investigates three opinions about 
time; he considers them all together after he distinguished them. For time is 
either change or that which primarily changes or the sphere or change of the 
whole; for the concept of time does not admit of changelessness or anything 
involving it. He makes a short reply to that by saying that time is the motion 
of the heavens but a longer reply to the view that reduces time to being the 
same thing as change. The reason why they said that the heavens were time 
was apparently that everything was within the heavens and everything was in 
time. It is clear that those who said this were in the first place ignorant of the 
ambiguity of being in something. As we already know, Aristotle made the 
necessary distinctions in his discussion of place; for being in time is one 
thing, for being in a place another.∗∗  Furthermore, they were not expert in 
logic which is why he called the view simple-minded. To quote Aristotle: 
 
As to what time is or what is its nature, the traditional accounts 
give us as little light as the preliminary problems which we have 
worked through. Some asserts that it is (1) the movement of the 
whole, others that it is (2) the sphere itself… But as time is most 
usually supposed to be (3) motion and a kind of change…9  
 
Aristotle goes on to say that the parts of time are the past and the 
future, but the heavenly sphere has different parts; besides time has its being 
in becoming but the heaven does not. In addition to this, the parts of the 
sphere are not everywhere but time is everywhere and the older and the 
newer are in the same sphere but in the same time. However Aristotle 
considered this view too simple-minded to require discussion. He moves on 
to other view which said that time was the motion and revolution of the 
whole; for instance, a day is a time; but it is not the revolution, for a part of 
the cyclic motion is not a cyclic motion, nor a revolution. From this the 
conclusion is drawn that time is not the revolution of the whole, even if a 
certain time is a part of the revolution so that the whole of time is not the 
revolution. He adds another point to the argument by saying that if there 
                                                   
∗∗   For more information, see Aristotle’s book Physics, Book IV, Chapter 4. 
9 Aristotle, ,ibid. P.290. 
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were many heavens, the revolution of each of these would be a time so that 
there would be many times at once which is impossible. It is possible for 
many motions to be at once but not many times. It is because the same now 
is everywhere the same. 
So far Aristotle has set forth two theories about time. He now 
illustrates the third one by saying that time is some form of motion or 
change. This is clearly a different theory from that which says time is the 
revolution of the whole. According to Urmson, Aristotle shows that change 
and time are not the same; for that reason he said that all change and motion 
is only in that which changes or where the changing thing itself happens to 
be itself.10 I think that this is the significance shown by the other additional 
premise which says that time is equally everywhere and present in all things. 
Therefore if change is not equally everywhere but only there the moving 
thing is, nor present in all things but only in that which changes; it is clear 
that time is not change. Moreover change is quicker and slower but time is 
not quicker and slower; therefore time is not change. That time is not quicker 
and slower is clear from experience. It is because we speak of much and 
little time but not quicker and slower.11 
Having shown that time is not change, he next shows that it is not 
without change. Since time is not without change and since one can not 
conceive of time without change; Aristotle goes on by saying that time is 
imperceptible to us without change, therefore the existence of time involves 
change and without it time cannot even be thought. That time cannot be 
perceived without change, Aristotle proves by saying that when we are 
mentally unchanging or do not notice ourselves changing mentally, we think 
that no time has passed because one cannot be aware of time without 
awareness of change. Aristotle also asserts that when a certain time seems to 
have passed, simultaneously a certain change seems to have taken place. 
After he concluded that time is neither change nor without change and 
having embarked on a search for its essence, he first establishes that we are 
simultaneously aware of change and time. He says that even if it is dark so 
that we neither undergo bodily change nor perceive other things changing; 
but there is some change in the soul if the soul is thinking of something.12 As 
a result, not only is one aware of time when aware of change but also aware 
of change when aware of time. So if we take the two points together, time is 
related to change since he proved that it is not change. 
After showing that time accompanies change, Aristotle next 
investigates how it is related to change. According to Ariotti, time, Aristotle 
                                                   
10 Urmson, ibid., p. 114. 
11 Aristotle, ibid., pp. 289-290. 
12 Aristotle, ibid., p. 291. 
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thought, is indeed real, but time does not have an independent existence, that 
is, time does not exist without change. For time is perceived only when there 
is change or motion. However, the change or the movement is in the things 
while time is unique and universal. Besides, while change is generally not 
uniform, time is because change is always faster or slower, whereas time is 
not. Clearly then it is not movement. And yet, time and movement, for 
Aristotle, are mutually defining.13 Aristotle demonstrates that since change is 
continuous, it contains before and after. Change is continuous because the 
magnitude undergoing the change is continuous if the quantity of change is 
continuous, like the magnitude, it is clear that the quantity of time is also 
continuous.14 Finally Aristotle comes to define time by saying that time is 
the number of change since it can be numbered in respect of before and after. 
In other words, time is a number, but Aristotle thought, a special kind of 
number. For while numbers are formed from the discrete, irreducible unit, 
there is no minimum for time. It must be that time is a number in the sense 
that it is the numerable aspect of of motion. 
For Taylor, time is inseparably connected with movement or change. 
We only perceive that time has elapsed when we perceive that change has 
occurred. But time is not the same as change. For change is of different and 
incommensurate kinds, change of place, change of colour, etc.; but to take 
up time is common to all these forms of process. And time is not the same as 
motion. For there are different rates of speed, but the very fact that we can 
compare these different velocities implies that there are not different 
velocities of time. Time then is that in terms of which we measure motion, 
the number of motion in respect of before and after, i.e. it is that by which 
we estimate the duration of processes. Thus, for instance, when we speak of 
two minutes, two days, two months as required for a certain process to be 
completed, we are counting something. This something is time.15  
For the the time being, It is time to investigate the now in terms of 
Aristotle, because in my opinion, he starts casting doubt on the existence of 
the now on which time depends. In his book Physics in Chapter 11, Aristotle 
looks into the now. Having said that time is associated with change in 
coming to be and ceasing to be and again that it is different because changes 
are different from each other while all simultaneous times are the same, 
Aristotle says that the explanation of this is that the now is identical with the 
substrate. Now is a measure of time by which time is measured as successive 
just as number is measured by the unit. Then the difference and identity of 
                                                   
13 P.E. Ariotti., “The Concept of Time in Western Antiquity”, The Study of Time II
edit. By J.T. Fraser, N. Lawrance, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1975, p.75. 
14 Urmson, ibid., p.119. 
15 A.E. Taylor., Aristotle, New York: Dover Publications, 1956, p.65. 
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time is derived from the difference and identity of the nows. After he had 
said the now as substrate was the same, but its essence was different; he adds 
that the now measures time qua before and after. In addition to this, we come 
to know change, before and after via the now within it. For it is because the 
moving object comes to first one and one another part of the substrate that 
we recognize both the motion and the before and after, both in change and in 
time. So time can be recognized through the now. Having said how the now 
is related to time, that it is so related as is the moving object to motion, and 
that the now is more familiar than time, Aristotle now displays their 
coexistence again by using an analogy with the coexistence of the moving 
object and motion. That is to say, it is impossible for the time to be without 
the now and vice versa. Furthermore, for Aristotle, the now creates the 
time.16 
Again Aristotle demonstrates the continuity of time and its division 
at the now from its connection with the moving object and motion. However 
the now does not only make time continuous in accordance with its 
connection with the moving object, but it also divides time distinguishing the 
before and after of change. For that is how time is divided. It resembles not 
only the moving object in producing continuity and division but also the 
point in a certain fashion. For the point makes the length continuous; in a 
similar way the now both makes continuous time and divides it. So time is 
the number of the now but not through the same now being taken twice, like 
the point that is taken twice, but as it is first one and then another, one as 
beginning, the other as end.17 What Aristotle said is that the now is a limit in 
the same way as points which are the extremes of a single line. Since the 
now is as such the limit of time, and since time is nothing other than what is 
numbered in change, in relation to the before and after, which are the nows, 
he takes notice that when the now is taken as what is numbered in change, 
then it becomes the limit of change and is thus contingently a limit. But 
when it is treated as the limit of time, this is not so contingently; for as such 
it belongs to time. And since the now is a number everywhere, and a number 
everywhere is a number that numbers for the ten that counts ten horses also 
counts ten men, so the now is simultaneously everywhere and not in the 
change alone, of which it is a limit, not as a now but as a movement.18 
Aristotle goes on to say that time is continuous because it is the number of 
the continuous. For this is the essence of time, to be the number of change; 
for the being of time extends together with the continuity of the numbered 
change, and so must itself be continuous. For understanding Aristotle’ s 
                                                   
16 Aristotle, ibid., pp.291-292. 
17 Ibid., p.293. 
18 Ibid., p.294. 
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version of the now to ahigh level, I am going to look at John Protevi’s 
comments on it. Protevi formulates the issues about the now like this: 
The now provides for the functions of dividing and connecting time; 
the now has characteristics of both identity and difference; the now provides 
for time as the counting of change. According to Protevi, the nature of the 
now contains five major steps. First, the definition of time as counting of 
change provokes questions about the identity and difference of the now. 
Second, the analogy of the now and the moving point explains time as 
number. Third, the moving now is essential to time and divisibility of time. 
Forth, the moving now can account for the continuity and division of time. 
Fifth, the now is disanalogous to the fixed point. 
According to Protevi, the question of the identity and difference of 
time and the now arises when Aristotle discesses the counting that is time. 
The identity of the now is established via the ho pote en or ho pote on 
construction. The identity of the now attested to in the ho pote on is 
countered by the fact its being is different. The difference of the now is 
attributed to the defining of time as prior and posterior. For Protevi, it is 
possible to account for the identity and difference of the now through the 
number paradigm, the principles of counting although Aristotle will soon 
have recourse to the line paradigm. A moment of identity is needed for 
counting, for there must be a unit to be counted. A moment of difference is 
likewise necessary for counting is the counting off of different nows as 
different.19 
Now it is time we looked at Aristotle’s proposed solution to the 
problem of the identity and difference of the now. Protevi asserts that if 
change is ecstatic, then change is the crossing of a border marking off one 
state from the other. Time appears with the marking off, by the now, of two 
borders and a middle. The prior now marks a phase of the change different 
from the phase marked off by the posterior now and there arises a space 
between the phases of the change. For Aristotle, change requires a 
teleological taming of the exterior. The exterior of the first phase must be 
bound to the interior of the second; this binding is the work of the material 
subject in locomotion and form in generation. The differentiation that is 
change alteration in general, is never enough to disorganize the identity-
preserving character of the material subject or of form so that alteration is 
also identification, as the first phase becomes the second phase of the same 
change. Indeed this identification is the very basis for ordering phases as first 
and second so that retrospectively privation might be teleologically 
                                                   
19 John Protevi. Time and Exteriority, Aristotle, Heidegger and Derrida. 
London&Toronto. Bucknel University Press. 1994. p.72. 
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subordinated to form. So the prior now, if we follow this analogy to its limit 
becomes the privation of the posterior now into which it changes. 
Protevi goes on to say that it is through using such an analogy that 
Aristotle attemps to reconcile the number and line paradigms. First, here, 
Aristotle establishes the analogy as the now follows the body in locomotion; 
so time follows motion. Second, the prior and posterior are invoked: the 
prior and posterior are known in time as counted nows. Third, the identity 
and difference of the now are addressed. For Protevi, in the first move of this 
third step, the now is identical to that which it is when it is being the now. 
Here identity is assigned the now due to its following the body in locomotion 
which maintains an identity underneath its changing positions. 
In the second step, its being is different which is identified with the 
prior and posterior as counted nows. The analogy implies that as the same 
body travels, but different phases are counted off one as prior and the other 
as posterior; so there is a travelling now identical beneath its changes. 
 In the third major step, Aristotle establishes the essential reciprocity 
of the now and time. If there were no time, there would be no now and vice 
versa. 
The fourth step is the way the moving now can account for the 
continuty and division of time. Then time is also made continues by the now 
and divided at it. Here the time as line scheme is explicit, made possible by 
the analogy with the material identity and formal difference of locomotion. 
The moving now accounts for the unity of time, just as the moving body 
accounts for the unity of the locomotion. On the other hand, the moving now 
accounts for the divisibility of time, just as the moving body provides for the 
prior and posterior in motion.20 
Finally, in the fifth step, according to Protevi, Aristotle identifies 
some disanalogies of the now and a fixed point. The fixed point can be one 
in number, but two in form, as the beginning of one segment and the end of 
another. However, this requires a stop and nows do not stop. Here, there is 
correspondence with the point; for the point also both connects and 
terminates the length. It is the beginning of one and the and of another. But 
when you take it in this way, using the one point as two, a pause is necessary 
if the same point is to be both the beginning and the end. On the other hand, 
the now since the body carried is moving, is always different.21 
In the final analysis, as we have seen, the now binds time together. 
Before saying this, Aristotle had said that time is continuous through the 
now and divided at the now. The parts of time, the past and the future, are 
                                                   
20 Ibid., p.73. 
21 Ibid., p.74. 
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joined together at the now, which becomes a common boundary belonging to 
both. I think for that reason, the now holds time together. But when it is 
taken and conceived as the limit of the past and the beginning of the future, 
the now divides it. So Aristotle calls the now the limit of one time and the 
beginning of the other. In addition to this, Aristotle goes on to say that the 
now could not exist if time did not exist. In fact the now is essentially the 
end of the past and the beginning of the future. Aristotle also held that the 
now persists. So the being of the now is surely sufficient to secure the being 
of time. 
In a few words, time is referred by Aristotle to our consciousness of 
a succession in our thoughts and a sense of difference between the events of 
our experience. It is not observed when we are conscious of no change and it 
is described as a numeration of movement as to its priority and posteriority. 
Furthermore, time is necessarily eternal since without it, the conception of 
before and after would be impossible. However since time is eternal, 
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